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GENERAL TELEPHONE CO. v EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION: SPECIAL TREATMENT FOR THE EEOC
INTRODUCTION
The Fifth and the Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals reached different
conclusions' about whether the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) must be certified as the class representative in suits brought in
its name under section 706 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 as
amended in 1972. 3 In General Telephone Co. v. EEOC,4 the Supreme Court
settled the conflict by affirming the Ninth Circuit's holding; thus, the EEOC
may bring a section 706 action seeking relief for a group of aggrieved indi-
viduals without obtaining class certification pursuant to rule 23 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.5 The dissenters agreed with the Fifth Circuit
court's reasoning in EEOC v. D.H Holmes Co .6 and would have reversed the
appellate court's decision.
7
1. In EEOC v. D.H. Holmes Co., 556 F.2d 787, 797 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. dented, 436 U.S.
962 (1978), the court held that certification was required. In EEOC v. General Tel. Co., 599
F.2d 322, 333 (9th Cir. 1979), aj'd, 446 U.S. 318 (1980), the court held that certification was not
required.
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 253
(1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h (1976)).
3. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h (1976).
4. 446 U.S. 318 (1980).
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common
to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if
the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party op-
posing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as
a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests;
or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corre-
sponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudica-
tion of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest
of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of sepa-
rate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy
already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesir-
ability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
6. 556 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1977), crt. denied, 436 U.S. 962 (1978).
7. 446 U.S. at 334.
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I. TITLE VII AND THE EEOC
The EEOC was created by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to ensure equal-
ity of employment opportunities by eliminating discrimination based on
color, sex, religion, race, or national origin. 8 As originally conceived, the
Commission could only conciliate, mediate, or persuade a business to change
its employment practices.
9
Two methods of judicial enforcement were available under the Act.
Section 706 allowed an individual to seek an injunction against or back pay
from an employer. Section 707 "pattern-or-practice" suits could be brought
only by the Attorney General. The statute did not expressly include back
pay as a remedy.10 Only sixty-nine suits were brought between 1965 and the
1972 amendments, I and back pay was not awarded in a section 707 action
until 1972.12
In 1972, Congress deemed it imperative to provide the EEOC with
more effective enforcement powers to help reduce employment discrimina-
tion. As originally proposed, the amendments to the 1964 Act would have
given the EEOC authority, comparable to that of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB), to issue cease-and-desist orders. 13 As finally enacted,
the amendments allowed the EEOC to bring civil suits in its own name in
federal court under either section 706 or section 707.14 A major reason for
choosing the court system was the time factor; it was thought that the federal
courts could provide relief more quickly than an administrative agency.
Furthermore, the legislators believed that the rules and procedures of the
federal courts would be more effective. 15
The EEOC now has various opportunities to litigate. Under section
706, an individual must initiate the procedure by filing a charge with the
8. See generally Developments in the Law--Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Ciil
Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1971).
9. Section 706(a), 78 Stat. 259 (1964) (currently at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1976)), au-
thorized an aggrieved individual to file a charge with the EEOC. After an investigation, if the
EEOC found that there was "reasonable cause" to believe the charge was true, the Commission
could use "informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion" to settle the conflict.
If the Commission were unsuccessful in achieving voluntary compliance, the charging party
could bring suit against the employer; the EEOC, however, could not. The EEOC could only
recommend to the Attorney General that a pattern-or-practice suit be brought.
10. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 707, 78 Stat. 261 (1964)
(prior to 1972 amendment).
11. 118 CONG. REC. 4080 (1972).
12. United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 920-21 (5th Cir. 1973). Georgia
Power was followed in other circuits, e.g., EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 314 (6th
Cir. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 951 (1977), and remains the standard for federal courts.
13. 118 CONG. REC. 3965-79, 4047-83 (1972) reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, SENATE
COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 118, 248, 279, 589, 645, 690 (1972) [here-
inafter cited as 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. For a thorough discussion of the legislative his-
tory of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, see Bumpass, The Application of Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to Actions Brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 343 (1979).
14. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 §§ 706-707, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 to -6
(1976).
15. See 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 13, at 122, 201, 226, 229, 278, 549, 688,
690, 694, 697, 794-95, 797, 988-89, 1270-71, 1347, 1694.
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Commission. During the ensuing 180 days, the EEOC alone may sue. Sub-
sequently, the Commission may proceed only if the individual has not
brought suit. 16 No time limit is imposed on the EEOC's authority to com-
mence an action based on an individual's complaint. ' 7 If the charging party
does sue, the EEOC may intervene with the.permission of the court, and the
suit may be expanded, at the discretion of the trial judge, to allow the EEOC
to redress additional incidents of employment discrimination discovered in
the original investigation. 18
II. THE BACKGROUND OF GENERAL TELEPHONE
The EEOC, rather than the Attorney General, now brings the section
707 pattern-or-practice suits. The question of class certification in a section
707 action has not been carefully considered by a court. 19 The debate over
class certification for the EEOC in section 706 actions has been raging for
eight years; by statutory directive, all section 707 actions are to be conducted
in accordance with the procedures set forth in section 706.20 Interestingly,
the debate has not touched section 707 suits. With the Court's decision in
General Telephone, however, section 707 has become, as Senator Williams said
during the 1972 debates, "a redundancy in the law."
2 '
A. The Facts
Four women employed in the Beaverton, Oregon, facility of General
Telephone Company of the Northwest, Inc. (General Telephone) filed
charges with the EEOC alleging employment discrimination based on sex.
Specifically, the employees claimed discrimination with respect to restric-
16. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976), pro-
vides:
(a) The Commission is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person
from engaging in any unlawful employment practice as set forth in section 2000e-2 or
2000e-3 of this title.
(b) Whenever a charge is filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be ag-
grieved, or by a member of the Commission, alleging that an employer . . .has en-
gaged in an unlawful employment practice, the Commission shall serve a notice of the
charge . . .on such employer . . .within ten days, and shall make an investigation
thereof. . . .If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is not
reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, it shall dismiss the charge. . . . If
the Commission determines after such investigation that there is reasonable cause to
believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such
alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, concilia-
tion, and persuasion . . . .The Commission shall make its determination on reason-
able cause as promptly as possible and, so far as practicable, not later than one
hundred and twenty days from the filing of the charge or, where applicable under
subsection (c) or (d) of this section, from the date upon which the Commission is au-
thorized to take action with respect to the charge.
17. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
18. E.g., EEOC v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 493 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1974).
19. &e generally Certifation of EEOC Clas Suas Under Rule 23, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 690
(1979).
20. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 § 707(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(e) (1976),
provides: "All such actions [§ 707] shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures set
forth in section 2000e-5 [§ 706] of this title."
21. 118 CONG. REc. 4081 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams); 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 13, at 1590.
19811
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tions on maternity leave and appointments to craft jobs and management
positions. After investigating the charges, the EEOC sued General Tele-
phone, its subsidiary, West Coast Telephone Company of California, Inc.,
and a local union of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers in
April 1977.22 The EEOC's complaint, brought under section 706(0(1) of
Title VII, 23 sought injunctive relief and back pay for all women who might
have been affected by the alleged unlawful practices. Included in this cate-
gory were all female workers, all female job applicants, and all women who
might have applied for jobs but were dissuaded by the challenged activities.
Presumably, 116 General Telephone facilities in five different states would
be affected by the action. The EEOC did not call the suit a class action nor
did it mention rule 23 in the complaint.
2 4
In August 1977, the EEOC sought an order bifurcating the issue of class
liability from the issue of individual damages, and the company requested
dismissal of the "class action aspects" of the complaint. The district court
referred the motions to a magistrate according to section 706(0(5).
25 In his
report, the magistrate listed three reasons for his recommendation that rule
23 should not apply to the EEOC's section 706 suits: (1) the EEOC has
never been required to comply with rule 23 in section 707 suits and should
be treated no differently in section 706 suits; (2) the statute gives the EEOC
the authority to bring suit on behalf of a class; and (3) it is "undesirable and
22. EEOC v. General Tel. Co., 599 F.2d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1979).
23. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 § 706(l(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l)
(1976), states:
If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission or within thirty days
after expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) or (d) of this section,
the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agree-
ment acceptable to the Commission, the Commission may bring a civil action against
any respondent not a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision
named in the charge . . . .The person or persons aggrieved shall have the right to
intervene in a civil action brought by the Commission . . . . If a charge filed with the
Commission pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, is dismissed by the Commission,
or if within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such charge . . . the Com-
mission has not filed a civil action under this section. . . the Commission . . .shall so
notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a
civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge (A) by the
person claiming to be aggrieved or (B) if such charge was filed by a member of the
Commission, by any person whom the charge alleges was aggrieved by the alleged
unlawful employment practice. Upon application by the complainant and in such
circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for such
complainant and may authorize the commencement of the action without the pay-
ment of fees, cost, or security. Upon timely application, the court may, in its discre-
tion, permit the Commission . . . to intervene in such civil action upon certification
that the case is of general public importance. Upon request, the court may, in its
discretion, stay further proceedings for not more than sixty days pending the termina-
tion of State or local proceedings described in subsection (c) or (d) of this section or
further efforts of the Commission to obtain voluntary compliance.
24. 446 U.S. at 321-22.
25. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 § 706(f)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(5)
(1976), provides:
It shall be the duty of the judge designated pursuant to this subsection to assign the
case for hearing at the earliest practicable date and to cause the case to be in every
way expedited. If such judge has not scheduled the case for trial within one hundred
and twenty days after issue has been joined, that judge may appoint a master pursuant
to rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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impractical" to require EEOC compliance with rule 23.26 The district court
accepted the magistrate's recommendations, denied General Telephone's
motion, and certified the question for interlocutory appeal.
27
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that Title VII gives the
EEOC standing to sue on behalf of discriminatees, and that Congress did not
expressly mandate that a section 706 action comply with rule 23. The court
also ruled that no distinction need be drawn between the procedures in sec-
tion 706 and in section 707 actions. 28 Thus, since section 707 actions have
never been subject to the strictures of rule 23, section 706 actions should not
be so bound. In affirming the lower court's holding, the appeals court stated
that "[t]he certification process would be time consuming and costly, and
would serve no useful purpose in the final disposition of the case."
2 9
The court's ruling conflicted with the Fifth Circuit's decision in EEOCV.
D.H. Holmes Co. 30 and represents an area where a great amount of judicial
time has been spent. 31 Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
and heard oral arguments in March 1980.32
B. The Fifth Ci'rcut's Position
Before Holmes, five district courts considered the question raised in Gen-
eral Telephone and found rule 23 inapplicable to EEOC suits. 33 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, however, reached the opposite conclusion in a
comprehensive opinion. 34 Although the EEOC complaint in Holmes was not
styled as a class action, the EEOC argued that the suit sought "broad relief
for a class of persons." 35 After reviewing the 1972 legislative history and the
history and purposes of rule 23, the court dismissed the EEOC's contentions
that Congress had created a statutory class action independent of rule 23
and that the EEOC, which is never a member of the class suffering injury,
could not comply with the rule.
36
The Fifth Circuit expressed particular concern for the defendant's pro-
cedural rights, noting that the defendant company did not know, even eight-
een months after the initial complaint was filed, "against whom and upon
what ground precisely it must defend."'37 The EEOC's push for "class action
26. EEOC v. General Tel. Co., 599 F.2d 322, 325-26 (9th Cir. 1979).
27. Id. at 326.
28. Id. at 327-28, 333.
29. Id. at 334.
30. 556 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 962 (1978).
31. See note 48 infa.
32. 446 U.S. at 320.
33. EEOC v. CTS of Asheville, Inc., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 852 (W.D.N.C. 1976);
EEOC v. Vinnell-Dravo-Lockheed-Mannix, 417 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Wash. 1976); EEOC v.
Rexene Polymers Co., 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 61 (W.D. Tex. 1975); EEOC v. Lutheran Hosp.,
10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1177 (E.D. Mo. 1974); EEOC v. Mobil Oil Corp., 6 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 727 (W.D. Mo. 1973). But see EEOC v. Datapoint Corp., 412 F. Supp. 406 (W.D. Tex.
1975), a'd in part, 570 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1978). See generally Reiter, TheA pphabiity of Rule 23
to EEOC Suits: An Examinzatin of EEOC v. D.H. Holmes Co., 28 SYRACUSE L. REV. 741 (1977).
34. EEOC v. D.H. Holmes Co., 556 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1977).
35. Id. at 793 (quoting brief of EEOC at 4).




discovery privileges without submitting to class action controls (and, in fact,
resisting them)"'38 offended the court's sense of fair play.
The salient points in the court's interpretation of section 706 were two:
(1) Congress did not expressly exempt the EEOC from compliance with rule
23 as it did the NLRB; 39 the EEOC has standing to sue to the same extent as
aggrieved individuals; 40 and, (2) Congress has previously created federal ac-
tions with procedures different from the federal rules and could have done so
in this instance. 4 ' The Holmes court maintained that a pattern-or-practice
suit can be brought if class certification for the EEOC fails and systemic
discrimination still seems to exist. Therefore, it concluded that the substan-
tive rights of employees and job applicants would be protected.
42
After Holmes, the EEOC continued its quest to pursue section 706 suits
without class certification. Some courts followed the Holmes approach;
4 3
some ruled that the EEOC could never be a class representative so the rule
obviously could not apply;44 and one held that compliance with the rule
would constitute interference with the congressionally created EEOC poli-
cies. 45 EEOC v. Akron National Bank & Trust Co .46 held that a class action
must be brought under section 707. The statutory design was far from obvi-
ous. Although Justice White, writing for the majority in General Telephone,
stated that a "straightforward reading" of the statute dictates rule 23's inap-
plicability to the EEOC's section 706 actions, 4 7 many jurists across the na-
tion might disagree.
48
C. Previrous Title VII Decisions
The Supreme Court's previous resolutions of Title VII procedural dis-
putes foreshadowed the result in General Telephone. Major themes in Title
38. Id. at 795.
39. Id. at 794.
40. Id. at 795 n. 12.
41. Special rules govern procedure under the Bankruptcy Act. Id. at 792 n.8.
42. Id.
43. E.g., EEOC v. Page Eng'r Co., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1638 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
44. EEOC v. Stroh Brewery Co., 83 F.R.D. 17 (E.D. Mich. 1979); EEOC v. Whirlpool
Corp., 80 F.R.D. 10 (N.D. Ind. 1978).
45. EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 84 F.R.D. 337 (W.D. Tenn. 1979).
46. 78 F.R.D. 684 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
47. 446 U.S. at 324.
48. District court cases in which rule 23 was held to apply in § 706 actions brought by the
EEOC include: EEOC v. Page Eng'r Co., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1638 (N.D. Ill. 1978);
EEOC v. Akron Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 78 F.R.D. 684 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Neidhardt v. D.H.
Holmes Co., No. 72-2395 (E.D. La. 1976), affd sub nom., EEOC v. D.H. Holmes Co., 556 F.2d
787 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 962 (1978).
District court cases in which rule 23 was held inapplicable to § 706 suits brought by the
EEOC include: EEOC v. Stroh Brewery Co., 83 F.R.D. 17 (E.D. Mich. 1979); EEOC v. Mid-
City Care Center, 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. 30,275 (W.D. Tenn. 1979); EEOC v. Bumble Bee
Seafoods Co., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9160 (D. Ore. 1979); EEOC v. Singer Controls Co. of
America, 80 F.R.D. 76 (N.D. Ohio 1978); EEOC v. Whirlpool Corp., 80 F.R.D. 10 (N.D. Ind.
1978); EEOC v. Schlueter Mfg. Co., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 53 (E.D. Mo. 1978); EEOC v.
General Tel. Co., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 476 (W.D. Wash. 1977); EEOC v. Pinkerton's Inc.,
14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1431 (W.D. Pa. 1977); EEOC v. CTS of Asheville, Inc., 13 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 852 (W.D.N.C. 1976); EEOC v. Vinell-Dravo-Lockheed-Mannix, 417 F. Supp. 575
(E.D. Wash. 1976); Stuart v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 66 F.R.D. 73 (E.D. Mich. 1975); EEOC v.
Lutheran Hosp., 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1177 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
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VII cases have been the plenary power of federal courts in such actions, the
restitutionary equitable relief available, and the public's interest in eliminat-
ing employment discrimination.
49
Plaintiffs, whether individuals, a class, or the EEOC, have been given
procedural advantages in prior cases. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.5°
held that the plaintiff is not limited to Title VII in his search for relief; al-
though other relief may be available, Title VII remedies remain independ-
ent of them. In a class action suit, United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald,5 1 the
Supreme Court held that full relief may be awarded to plaintiffs without
exhaustion of administrative remedies by unnamed class members. Occidental
Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC52 dealt with the time limits placed on the EEOC
for filing a section 706 suit; the Court interpreted the statute as imposing no
time limit on the EEOC's ability to file suit in federal court. In a strong
dissent, Justice Rehnquist pointed out that where Congress is silent about a
time period in a federal statute, the Court has traditionally applied the state
statute of limitations. The Court, however, in its allegiance to the legislative
mandate to eliminate employment discrimination through EEOC enforce-
ment actions, treated the EEOC in a new and special way.
In a 1974 decision, the Supreme Court concluded that a union member
subject to binding arbitration on employment matters may bring a section
706 action if the arbitration goes against his interests. The employer is
bound by the arbitration agreement, according to the rationale in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co.,53 but the employee has Title VII remedies available to
him, which are not affected by a "binding arbitration" clause. Formerly, the
Court had maintained that labor arbitration was the preferred means of set-
tling industrial disputes and that the decision should be final, binding all
parties. 54 The ruling in Alexander, as in other cases,55 highlights the overrid-
ing importance the Court assigns to Title VII actions.
The Supreme Court will apparently stop short of allowing the EEOC to
create new policies not in accordance with the Court's interpretation of the
statutory design, however. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver,56 for example, upheld the
provision for filing within 300 days of the alleged discrimination. The
EEOC was not allowed to manipulate the filing time for the charging party
since the maneuver did not comport with the Court's literal reading of the
statute and its interpretation of the legislative intent.
57
49. E.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). See aLso United States v.
Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
50. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
51. 432 U.S. 385 (1977).
52. 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
53. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
54. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). These decisions were
implicitly affirmed in Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), a.fdby an
equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
55. Ste cases cited in note 49 supra.
56. 100 S. Ct. 2486 (1980).
57. Lower courts have treated the EEOC mandates liberally. They have consistently up-
held departures from the statutory provision stating that "right to sue" letters will automatically
1981]
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III. THE GENERAL TELEPHONE RATIONALE
In its affirmance of the Ninth Circuit's holding that rule 23 does not
apply to the EEOC's section 706 suits, the majority, comprised of Justices
Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Stewart, and White, relied on "the language
of Title VII, the legislative intent underlying the 1972 amendments to Title
VII, and the enforcement procedures under Title VII prior to the amend-
ments. '"58 Based on its understanding of the 1972 statute, the Court held
that rule 23 is not applicable to an enforcement action, however it is charac-
terized, brought by the EEOC to halt unlawful employment practices.
The Court stated that rule 23 was not designed to encompass an admin-
istrative enforcement action and that a distortion of the rule would result
from applying it in section 706 actions. Its major concern was advancement
of the public interest in preventing discrimination in employment opportu-
nities. Without encumbering the agency by invoking the class action rule,
the decision gives the EEOC the freedom to pursue its statutorily-defined
objectives. The decision does not apply to other federal rules.5 9
The Court first outlined the procedure that an individual complainant
and the EEOC must follow in a section 706 action. The authorization of
back pay as a remedy should not, in the Court's opinion, trigger rule 23.
Next, the Court examined the purpose of the 1972 amendments. Because
the charging party retains certain private rights, such as intervening in the
EEOC suit or bringing his own civil suit at the end of the EEOC's exclusive,
180-day jurisdiction, the Court inferred from the statutory language that the
EEOC is not simply a representative of the discriminatee, as a class represen-
tative might be, but is a supplemental force for the private action and bears
the primary litigation burden.
Repeating a theme sounded in many lower courts,6° Justice White,
writing for the majority, stated: "When the EEOC acts, albeit at the behest
of and for the benefit of specific individuals, it acts also to vindicate the pub/ic
interest in preventing employment discrimination." 6 ' In reviewing the perti-
nent legislative history, the majority found it "clear" that the EEOC should
proceed in section 706 suits just as it proceeds in section 707 suits (that is,
without rule 23 certification) and said it is "clear" that Senator Javits' refer-
ence to class suits in debate6 2 was to the "availability of relief" and not to the
"procedure" to be applied.
be sent if the EEOC chooses not to sue. E.g., Williams v. Southern Union Gas Co., 529 F.2d
483 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 959 (1976); EEOC v. Meyer Bros. Drug Co., 521 F.2d 1364
(8th Cir. 1975).
58. 446 U.S. at 323.
59. Id. at 334 n.16.
60. See cases cited in note 48 supra.
61. 446 U.S. at 326 (emphasis added).
62. The following remarks were made during the floor debate about transfer of enforce-
ment power from the Attorney General to the EEOC, as provided in § 707. These remarks have
been the subject of great debate in the district courts' review of the rule 23 certification issue in
§ 706 actions. Senator Javits said:
These are essentially class actions, and if they [the EEOC] can sue for an individ-
ual claimant, then they can sue for a group of claimants.
It seems to me that this is provided for by the rules of civil procedure in the
Federal courts. . . . I have referred to the rules of civil procedure. I now refer specifi-
cally to rule 23 of those rules, which is entitled Class Actions and which give [sic] the
[Vol. 58:3
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The second part of the opinion discussed rule 23. Neither the history
nor the practical uses for this class action rule were considered; it was charac-
terized as a stumbling block to the EEOC's enforcement responsibilities.
The Court mentioned the problems of numerosity, typicality, and represen-
tativeness and again raised the "public interest" idea to justify its finding
rule 23 undesirable in such suits. Although it noted the defendant em-
ployer's objective in seeking a judgment binding on all class members, the
Court did not want to deviate from its interpretation of the statutory design.
Finally, the Court directed the lower courts to use their equitable pow-
ers to prevent double recovery or re-litigation by any individual receiving
benefits. The importance of this admonition, more a suggestion than a man-
date, cannot be overemphasized. The equitable powers of the federal courts
will stand as the critical check on the EEOC's future actions.
Although well-organized, the majority's opinion failed to address the
concerns of the dissenters, the Chief Justice, Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and
Stevens. It did not discuss important policy considerations such as prevent-
ing piecemeal suits, saving time and money, and protecting defendant em-
ployers from inconsistent adjudications. The Holmes court considered the
interests of both plaintiff and defendant and questioned whether a certifica-
tion requirement would impose a burden on the EEOC. 63 The Supreme
Court did not focus on these two ideas.
IV. THE IMPACT OF GEvERAL TELEPIhONE
A. From the EEOC's Perspectitwe
The significance of General Telephone for the EEOC is that the federal
courts now have a uniform rule to follow in section 706 actions brought by
the EEOC on behalf of a group of individuals; that rule benefits the EEOC.
For eight years, procedural questions flowing from the 1972 amendments
have been argued. A critical one has now been decided.
According to the present EEOC Chairman, Eleanor Holmes Norton,
the 1960's focused on law making, the 1970's focused on law development,
and the 1980's will focus on law application. 64 Since procedure should allow
substantive law to work, the EEOC can now utilize this new tool to proceed
with its emphasis on "comparable pay for comparable work" and to accom-
plish its added tasks of enforcing the Equal Pay Act 65 and the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act.6 The General Telephone decision will allow the
EEOC to direct its enforcement efforts against major employers practicing
opportunity to engage in the Federal Court in class actions by properly suing parties.
We ourselves have given permission to the EEOC to be a properly suing party.
118 CONG. REC. 4081-82 (1972).
63. 556 F.2d at 795-97.
64. Brisbon, Comparable Work Should Mean Comparable Pay, 6 EQUATOR No. 7, at 3 (1980).
65. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1976).
66. 26 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See Reorg. Plan No. I of 1978, Exec.




systemic discrimination without encountering the procedural difficulties
presented by class certification. A negative effect on settlement negotiations
might result, however; an employer might be more likely to settle with the
EEOC if the Commission were the certified class representative and the class
members were bound by the settlement terms.
67
The EEOC has consistently brought actions under section 706 for class-
type relief even though section 707 was available. Perhaps because the statu-
tory language of section 707 does not provide for back pay as a remedy,
section 707 has not been used more extensively. Class certification has not
been required in section 707 actions; this procedural wrangle could have
been avoided by bringing a pattern-or-practice suit. Perhaps there was con-
cern that the Supreme Court would follow a strict reading of the statute and
not allow back pay. To be sure, the importance of back pay as a stimulus for
employers to eliminate discriminatory employment practices cannot be over-
stated.68 Furthermore, the burden of proof is different in section 706 and
section 707 actions. As expressed in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co .69 and
in Teamsters v. United States,70 the section 706 burden of proof is met by dem-
onstrating the existence of a pattern and practice of discrimination, which
establishes a prima facie case. The burden then shifts to the employer to
prove that the individuals involved were not in fact victims of discrimina-
tion. In a section 707 suit, however, when the government alleges a practice
or pattern of discrimination, it must prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the discrimination is the employer's standard business practice.
71
Whatever its motivation, the EEOC has finally accomplished its goal.
In section 706 actions it can now avoid compliance with rule 23 class certifi-
cation requirements.
B. From the Employer's Perspective
The Court's opinion in General Telephone reflects a lack of concern for the
defendant employer's due process rights. The Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure apply to every civil action not exempted by rule 81.72 Since the NLRB
is exempted, 73 so could the EEOC have been. The major concern expressed
by the spokesman for General Telephone during the oral arguments was
that without rule 23 procedures, an employee might decline an award ob-
tained by the EEOC and bring a private suit against the employer to recover
a larger award . 74 Another concern was the tremendous discovery powers
available to the EEOC without certification. If a charging party files a com-
plaint and the EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe discriminatory prac-
tices are taking place, the EEOC can use the liberal discovery techniques
67. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1107 (1976).
68. See Edwards, The Back Pay Remedy tn Thte VII Class Acitns: Problems of Procedure, 8 GA.
L. REV. 781 (1974).
69. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
70. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
71. Id.
72. FED. R. Cxv. P. 1.
73. FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(5).
74. 48 U.S.L.W. 3653, 3654 (Mar. 25-26, 1980).
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allowed by the federal rules to gain access to all the employer's departments
and branches.
The Supreme Court called on the trial courts to use their equitable
powers. Certainly the employers have some protection from a frivolous suit
because they can recover their attorney's fees in such an instance. 75 The
EEOC should have been called on, though, to exercise care and reason in
lodging its complaints. An overzealous claim, for example, was filed in
EEOC v. Delaware Trust Co .76 On the basis of one complaint filed by a fe-
male employee, the EEOC leveled a multi-faceted charge, limited neither by
time nor by class of employee, against Delaware Trust. All personnel prac-
tices including hiring, recruitment, job classification, training, and promo-
tion were mentioned, but none of the asserted flaws in these areas were
described. 77 Without the constraints of rule 23 in a situation such as this,
the courts will have to exercise firm and wise control over the boundaries of
the case.
C. Rule 23
The class action rule was extensively revised in 1966, and rule 23(b)(2)
was enacted in part to assure that the class action device would be available
for enforcement of the civil rights statutes. 78 The Advisory Committee of
the Judicial Conference submitted the changes to the Supreme Court; the
revised rules took effect following the Court's approval and a congressional
vote. 79 The Court in General Telephone was remiss in not reconciling its hold-
ing with the mandate in rule 1 that all civil actions shall be governed by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.80
Title VII promotes the concept of a class as individuals sharing a com-
mon characteristic that subjects them to harmful treatment, an "entity class"
as one commentator describes it."' Title VII advocates a public policy for-
bidding employment discrimination against individuals because of their
membership in such an entity class. As a member of such a class, an individ-
ual (or the EEOC) bringing suit on his own behalf because of discrimination
based on his entity class characteristic seems also to be bringing suit on be-
half of all who share that feature. Perhaps this explains why the courts have
reshaped rule 23(b)(2) and why they have been fairly lenient in applying the
rule's requirements of numerosity, typicality, and commonality.
8 2
75, See Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
76, 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1521 (D. Del. 1979).
77. Id.
78. 3B J. M X)RE FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.02[2.-6] (2d ed. 1980). See also Developments in
the Lau-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1319 (1976).
79. 39 F.R.D. 69 (1966) (amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
80. FED. R. Civ. P. I.
81, Note, Antidiscrimination Class Actions under the Federal Rules of Cive Procedure: The Transfor-
mation of Rule 23 (b)(2), 88 YALE L.J. 868 (1979).
82. Id. For the Court's discussion of its treatment of rule 23 suits, see Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
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D. The Pub/'c Interest
Eliminating discrimination is undoubtedly in the public interest. The
Supreme Court's major thrust in Title VII cases has been to vindicate that
interest. For example, by liberally construing the filing provisions of section
706 in Love v. Pullman ,83 the Court aided litigants who might be unaware of
the second filing required when an initial filing mistake is made. And, by re-
affirming the independence of Title VII remedies available to aggrieved em-
ployees in Johnson v. Raz/way Express Agency, Inc.,84 employees are more as-
sured of full relief. With its decision in General Telephone, which removed the
need for the EEOC to become certified as a class representative in section
706 actions, the Court has enabled the EEOC to function more efficiently in
carrying out its statutory duties.
The public interest is served not only by the EEOC but also by private
litigants. The private right of action has many public interest characteris-
tics; among them are attorney's fees, affirmative action remedies, back pay,
and appointment of counsel at the discretion of the court. A private litigant
not only redresses his own injury but also serves the congressional policy of
fighting employment discrimination. Certainly an aggrieved individual can
serve as a class representative. 85 In General Telephone, the EEOC could have
sought class certification. Had certification been denied, the Commission
could have brought suit on behalf of the four individual charging parties.
86
One of the individuals could have served as a class representative. Alterna-
tively, the EEOC could have brought a section 707 suit. The public interest
could have been served without sidestepping the procedures outlined in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The public interest in eradicating job discrimination is only one of sev-
eral. One of the overriding interests in our legal system is that of a fair trial
for all parties. If a defendant's right to a suit conducted according to the
federal rules can be set aside with such aplomb, the public interest in fair
play in court is not served. The public has an interest in employers' provid-
ing jobs and achieving high levels of production, but it has no interest in
having business earnings spent unnecessarily on piecemeal suits arising be-
cause an EEOC suit did not decisively settle an issue. In fact, the burden on
the business community created by duplicative suits might well be some-
thing our economy cannot afford.
CONCLUSION
As George Orwell penned in Animal Farm, "all animals are equal, but
some animals are more equal than others." The EEOC is treated as a "spe-
cial animal" in General Telephone. Although the agency is not expressly ex-
empted from complying with rule 23 in section 706 class type actions, the
Supreme Court held that rule 23 was not meant to apply to such actions and
83. 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
84. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
85. Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 525 (6th Cir.), cerl. denied, 429 U.S. 870
(1976). See East Tex. Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
86. See note 23 supra.
[Vol. 58:3
1981] SPECIAL TREA TMENT FOR THE EEOC 665
would be distorted if it were. Fairness to the defendant employer should be
supplied through the equitable powers of the federal courts rather than
through this procedural safeguard. Undoubtedly this standard will be ap-
plied to other enforcement proceedings brought by federal agencies. After
eight years of motions, arguments, and conflicting court decisions on this
issue, the decision is welcomed for its finality.
Chrstine Kirkpatrick Trti

